Abstract
Introduction
In response to congressional pressure, the Federal Reserve adopted annual monetary growth targets and began announcing them to the public in 1975. Many economists view the establishment of monetary targets as a positive development for two reasons. First, money growth targets allow central banks to signal their intentions to get tough on inflation. If they do this in a credible manner, then the social costs of pursuing anti-inflationary policies can, presumably, be reduced.1 Second, credible monetary targets cause the money supply to follow a mean-reverting process. To the extent that there is a strong relationship between the money supply and the aggregate price level, the targets cause the latter to also be mean-reverting, thus reducing longterm price level uncertainty in the economy. Lower uncertainty about future prices, in turn, raises the allocative efficiency of capital markets and leads to increased economic growth. In the eyes of many economists, the Federal Reserve has been steering without a rudder since it effectively abandoned its commitment to monetary growth targets in 1982 (p.52) . ..after mid-1982 there was no reason for anyone to find the Federal Reserve's commitment to its stated money growth targets credible (p. 65).
In contrast, Eichenbaum (1992) argues that the Federal Reserve has had much more difficulty establishing credibility:
. . . the issue of monetary targeting in the United States just isn't interesting from a positive point of view. We Never had it. What the Fed targeted in 1979 was high nominal interest rates, not low growth rates of Ml. Surely no one believed otherwise -now or then. (p. 2321
These disparate views about the Federal Reserve's ability to set credible monetary targets suggest the need for additional empirical work.
This paper examines the credibility of the Federal Reserve's monetary targets. To do this, the paper uses survey data on money growth forecasts collected on a quarterly basis since 1978 by the Washington Bond C Money Market Report. This data provides us with a unique opportunity to examine whether the monetary targets have influenced money growth expectations and, if they have, how the influence has changed over time. Moreover, we can use the data to explore whether credibility has responded to: i) the nature of the monetary regime employed by the Federal Reserve, ii) the Federal Reserve's reputation in hitting the targets, and iii) the stance of fiscal policy.
The paper is outlined as follows. The next section discusses previous work that has attempted to measure credibility. Section two presents the Federal Reserve's annual and near-term monetary targets and separates the deviations from the annual targets into desired and undesired components. The third section discusses the survey data used in the study. The fourth section constructs the empirical model. The main empirical results are presented in sections five and six. The final section concludes the paper and discusses the policy implications.
Previous Work
One approach that has been employed to investigate the existence of credibility is to examine inflation-unemployment trade-offs or term structure equations across different monetary regimes. If a new anti-inflationary regime is credible, then a Phillips curve, estimated over some previous regime, should over-predict the rate of inflation during the period when the anti-inflation regime in place. Similarly, a credible anti-inflationary regime should, everything else held constant, cause expected inflation and long-term interest rates to fall. Using these approaches, Blanchard (19841 found evidence that the policy regime put in place by the Federal Reserve in 1979 attained some credibility.
Blackburn and Christensen (1989) point out that both of these approaches have drawbacks. First, the Phillips curve approach focuses on variables that adjust sluggishly to changes in the environment and thus are "not well suited for testing the forward-looking aspects of rational forecasting that are endemic to the credibility hypothesis." Second, term structure models do not provide precise results because it is difficult to disentangle the impact on long-term rates of, on the one hand, lower inflationary expectations and, on the other, the effect of tight money and higher current short-term rates.
Third, both the Phillips curve and term structure approaches might produce misleading results if the prediction errors from these models are not due solely to the missing "credibility variable".
One way to overcome these problems is to construct more direct tests of the credibility hypothesis using survey data to measure market expectations. This is the approach used by Frankel and Hardouvelis (1985) the response of commodity prices to unexpected increases in the money supply.
If the response is negative (i.e., unexpected increases in the money supply One potential problem with using commodity prices reactions to unanticipated money growth to measure credibility is that the relationship between money and inflation may not be stable. 3 That is, the correlation between commodity prices and unexpected money might weaken not because the Federal Reserve has lost credibility, but because market participants believe that money growth no longer has a strong impact on inflation. In fact, it has been noted by many researchers (see Friedman 1988) that the correlation between money growth and inflation has deteriorated significantly in the post-1982 period. This potential problem is magnified when the analysis focuses on long periods of time as we do in this study. We can avoid this problem by focusing directly on money growth expectations rather than inflation expectations. intended to be a tool for achieving the annual targets. If the money stock moved outside one of the annual ranges, the near-term target was suppose to be set to bring the money stock back into the range. If the money stock remained within the annual ranges, the near-term target was set to keep it there.
Monetary Targets

A+ The Targets o---
However, as Meulendyke (1988, p. 13) points out the FMOC "sometimes approved growth rates that stretched out the period for bringing money back on track, and on occasion it acknowledged that target growth probably would not be achieved within the year." According to, Meulendyke the FOMC allowed the money stock to deviate from the annual target ranges for two reasons. First, they were often skeptical about staff forecasts. Second, they were frequently unwilling to pay the high cost associated with raising the federal funds rate to the level needed to bring the money stock back into line.
B. Actual Versus Targeted Money Stocks
The ability of the Federal Reserve to hit their monetary growth targets has received considerable attention from economists, with increased attention usually given at times when there have been large divergences. 
C. The Source of Deviations
The fact that the Federal Reserve stopped establishing Ml and M2 targets following periods when these aggregates deviated from their target by increasing magnitudes raises two questions. First, did reduced controlability lead to large and persistent deviations and subsequently to the deemphasis of in 1993 when targets for it are no longer set.
Measuring Money Growth Expectations
To measure money growth expectations, we use survey data collected on a
quarterly basis by the Washington Bond G Money Market Report (the Report). 9
Starting in 1978, the Report has collected money growth forecast from a group of financial sector economists at the end of each quarter. 10 The forecasts are quarter-over-quarter projections of money growth one and two quarters into the future. Figure 4 illustrates the mean forecasts of the group for one and two quarter horizons. To our knowledge this is the only survey that provides money growth forecasts over these relatively long horizons.
Three features of the survey data warrant discussion. First, the money stock forecasted by the group changes over the sample; the group forecasts Ml growth from 1978:Q2 to 1983:Q3 and 1984:Q3 to 1987 :l (the shaded periods in Figure 41 , and M2 growth from 1982:Q4 to 1984:Q2 and 1987:Q2 to 1993:Q4.11 Since the money stock forecasted by the group generally coincides with the aggregate emphasized by the Federal Reserve in it targeting efforts, l2 a finding that the targets do not influence expectations can not occur because the group and the Federal Reserve are focusing on different aggregates.
Second, the group forecasts money growth using the current quarter stock as the base before it is known. Fortunately, the Report provides money the group with a projected growth rate of the money stock for the current quarter.
Using this projection and knowledge of 'K
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current quarter money stock can be estimated.
Third, a common criticism leveled at the use of survey data to measure expectations is that iiieiibeis of CL-C__^^^_ I_,.,*. with probability (l-pt)
where me t t+i is the market's money growth expectation, obtained from the mt t+i is expected money growth based on some alternative (non-target) model;
, and p, (0 s /3 t I 1) is the probability that money growth is governed by the target model. That is, /3, measures target credibility.
To estimate m: t+i, we take the annualized growth rate between the money , stock at t and the level implied by the midpoint of the target range at the end of the calendar year. This approach is iiiustrated in Figure 5 for the two-quarter-ahead forecast. Note that preliminary targets for the following year are used in the construction of mi t+2 in the third quarter and fourth Many different specifications could be used to represent the non-target model. Its seems reasonable, however, to limit the analysis to simple time series models augmented with important state variables that are believed to drive money growth. One such state variable is the deficit. When there is a non-zero probability that the Federal Reserve will monetize the deficit, larger deficits should lead to expectations of higher monetary growth. Given this consideration, the non-target model we consider is: 
where u t N N(0, ~~1; mt and mt_r are contemporaneous and lagged money growth;
and DEF+ is the ratio of the federal government deficit to gross domestic c product.
Combining the target and non-target models, money growth expectations can be written as: 
where:
Two features of (4) 
Empirical Results
A. Time-Invariant Model
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unuel-one assump~~oii coefficients are not time-varying. Due to the potential for heteroscedaticity generated by time-varying credibility, the models are estimated with methodof-moment techniques to obtain consistent estimates of the covariance matrix and standard errors. Also, error terms in models that use two-quarter-ahead forecasts should follow, at a minimum, a first-order moving-average process because the forecast horizon in these models is longer than the observation interval. This potential source of serial correlation is taken into account when the method-of-moment procedure is used. 14 Data from the second quarter of 1978 to the second quarter of I993 is used to estimate the models. Two important variables missing from regression 1 are contemporaneous and lagged money growth. In fact, one possible explanation for the negative /3 estimates in Table 2 is that m't t+i tends to fall and become negative when Table 2 adds the deficit-GDP ratio to the model. The results show that the deficit-GDP ratio has a positive impact on money growth expectations at both the one-and two-quarter horizons. Note also that the ..l~..,,..,,-+:r, -Cl+ir+:nr. .,-,.A to test for serial n-P-rc.lnfinn i mr\rr\\,n cr\mclr.rh= t UL*g;ll"sLIL 3LQC13LILZ U3F;U cl", I rzIa.cL"II rrrLp,l ""c.z a"111b"lLur.
when the deficit variable is added and that the t-statistic for B rises in the two-quarter-ahead model. This last finding is somewhat surprising because it suggests that the targets remained credible even when the fiscal landscape of the Report believed that part of the deficit increase during the 1980s was going to be monetized.
B. The Time-Varying Model
Equation (4) shows that fluctuations in credibility cause the reduced form coefficients linking money growth expectations to its determinants to become time-varying. To examine whether this is fact the case, we employ Kalman filter techniques to recursively estimate regression 4 in Table 2 .
Estimates over the 1978:Q2 to 1980:Q4 period were used to initialize the Kalman filter. Figures 6 and 7 illustrate the coefficient evolution from the models estimated with one-and two-quarter forecast horizons respectively. Third, whiie the p coefficient is not significantiy different from zero for the one-quarter-ahead forecasts for most of the sample, it is for the twoquarter-ahead forecasts. In fact, /3 is insignificantly different from zero for the two-quarter-ahead forecasts only in the six quarter period beginning in 1981:Ql and the insignificance over this period may be due to the small number of observations available early in the sample. The high level of target credibility exhibited for the 1978:Q2 to 1980:Q4 period is somewhat crrrnricinn niv0,n thLe general cor&ser&s,us irk the YU'P'LYL"6 6""" 
Explaining Time-Varying Credibility
The findings of the previous section raise an important question: why has the credibility of the monetary targets varied over time? The next section examines factors discussed in the literature that might account for timevarying credibility and outlines the empirical approach we use to quantify these effects.
16 The following section discuss the empirical results.
A. Theoretical and Empirical Issues
The first factor that might account for changes in credibility is the operating procedure followed by the Federal Reserve. From October 1979 to October 1982, the Federal Reserve placed greater emphasis on controlling the money supply. To achieve this objective, it targeted nonborrowed reserves and aiiowed the federai funds rate to fiuctuate in a much wider range then in the past. In addition, the Federal Reserve implemented other more technical measures designed to enhance control over the money supply. To the extent that these procedural changes were perceived as successful by the public, the credibility of the monetary targets should have increased. In contrast, the 
B. Empirical Results
Before investigating the impact of these three variables on credibility,
we first examine whether credibility changes when the particular monetary aggregate forecasted by the Report group changes. This is accomplished by constructing one additional interaction term created by multiplying m: t+i by This last finding provides some evidence that the Ml targets had higher credibility than the M2 targets.
Rows 2 through 4 of Table 3 report results for regressions that include the other interaction terms. The results presented in row 2 of both panels suggest that credibility was not higher during the 1979:Q4 to 1982:Q3 period.
That is, g is not significantly different from zero when Xt is set equal to the 7982t dummy. One explanation for this finding is that Mlt and 7982t are highly correlated (i.e., the forecast group forecasted Ml for the entire _^^A __ 1979:Q4-l98z:yj periodj and that this multicollinearity lowers the t-statistic shows that g is negative and significant at only the ten percent level.
Overall, the results provide some evidence that the higher deficits of the 1980s caused the credibility of the monetary targets to fall.
The final regressions attempt to determine whether the Federal Reserve's past performance in hitting their monetary targets, or reputation, has an impact on its credibility. The bottom row in panel A and B of Table 3 shows results for models that include the interaction term with Xt = DEVSUMt.
Interestingly, the coefficient on this interaction term, g, is negative and significantly different from zero at the five percent level in regressions that use the one-and two-quarter forecasts. This finding suggests that the credibility of the targets increased following periods when the Federal Reserve had been relatively successful hitting the targets. Perhaps more surprising, however, is the finding that the targets continued to be credible in the post-1985 period even though they were deemphasized by the Federal Reserve during this time.
Second, we show that two factors had a significant impact on credibility.
The first is the federal government deficit -higher deficits lead to lower target credibility. This finding suggests that the stance of fiscal policy can undermine a central bank's credibility when it is expected to monetize a portion of the deficit. The second factor is Federal Reserve reputation of controlling money growth within the target ranges. The paper finds that the more the actual money stock has deviated from the target level in the past, the lower is Federal Reserve credibility. This result suggests that central banks can raise their credibility by doing what they say they are going to do.
What policy implications should be drawn from these findings? If there was a strong empirical relationship between money growth and inflation, then these findings could provide a rationale for central banks to emphasize monetary growth targets. By taking the targets seriously and allowing them to constrain money growth, disinflationary policies could be pursued at lower social costs and long-term price level uncertainty and its associated costs could be reduced. NOTES: 'The target is for Ml-A.
2The t-rncrt is for !I-B* cur6-C 3The FMOC announced its range would be 4The FMOC stated at "around the top of at the July meeting that growth in Ml-B near the end of "acceptable and desirable."
the July 1 meeting that growth of the monetary aggregates the indicated ranges would be acceptable in light of the relatively low base period for the Ml target and other factors, and that it would tolerate for some period of time growth somewhat above the target range should unusual precautionary demands form money and liquidity be evident in light of current economic uncertainties." 5A February-March base period was established for M2.
6A second quarter of 1983 base period was established for Ml.
7The FMOC stated at the January meeting that Ml would be given less weight _L___--_ Ithan the broader aggregates due to cnanges in ihe Eii Velocity aiid &iaiigd composition of Ml.
8The FMOC agreed that "growth in the monetary aggregates in the upper part of their ranges for 1985 may be appropriate..."
'A second quarter of 1985 base period was established for Ml.
"Although the Ml range was not formally altered, the FMOC stated that they would allow money growth to exceed the upper bound.
"The FMOC "agreed that growth in these [the M21 aggregates around the lower ends of their ranges might be appropriate, depending on the circumstances. 
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. NOTES: A; t+i is the mean forecast of money growth over the next i quarters from the'kport; m: t+, is money growth over the next i quarters assuming that the money stock converges to the midpoint of the target range by years end; m and m t t 1 are contemporaneous and lagged money growth; DEFt is the ratio of the federal deficit to gross domestic product.
Significance at the one, five and ten percent levels given by a, b and c respectively. 
7
For the period prior to October 1979 when the FMOC set near-term targets with one month horizons, we use the money stock for the second month of the quarter and apply the near-term target to it to get the desired deviation at the end of the quarter.
8
The minutes from the FMOC meetings during 1986 suggest that the large money stock deviations were due to both desired and undesired sources. For example, at the July meeting the FMOC acknowledged that changes in Ml velocity forced them to let Ml money growth exceed the target levels:
Because of the substantial uncertainties surrounding the behavior of Ml in relation to economic activity and prices and the substantial decline in velocity in the first half of the year, the Committee decided that Ml growth in excess of the previously established 3 to 8 percent range would be acceptable for the year.
However, the issue of controlability rises at the August 19 meeting:
. . . growth in Ml was expected to moderate from the exceptionally large increase during the second quarter. With the prospective behavior of Ml remaining subject to unusual uncertainty, the Committee again decided not to specify a rate of expected growth in the operational paragraph of the directive...
9
Formally known as The Goldsmith-Nagan Bond and Money Market Letter.
10
The Report usually mails the surveys on the second or third Friday of the last month of the quarter. Most surveys are returned and the mean forecasts published within two weeks after the surveys are distributed.
llThe group forecasts Ml-A growth during 1980 and Ml-B growth during 1981. For example, the group stopped forecasting Ml and began forecasting M2 during the fourth quarter of 1982 following Federal Reserve Chairman Volker's October 1982 announcement that the Ml target was no longer in effect.
13
For example, see Froot (1989) and Ferderer and Shadbegian (1993) . The latter paper show that term premia estimated using interest rate forecasts from the Report are more sensitive to changes in market risk than are term premia estimated using other measures of expectations.
14 This involves using the ROBUSTERRORS option in the RATS LINREG command with LAGS set equal to 1.
15
Contemporaneous money growth is measured using the projected money growth over the quarter provided by the Report. We use this measure rather than actual money growth because the latter is not known by the group when they make their forecasts.
16
See Blackburn and Christensen (1989) for a good discussion of these factors.
17
For this reason, Friedman (1988, p. 65) concludes that "After mid-1982 there was no reason for anyone to find the Federal Reserve's commitment to its stated money growth targets credible." In particular, they discuss the work of Sargent (19811 and Baxter (1985) .
Sargent argues that the severe hyperinflations in Austria, Germany, Hungary and Poland in the 1920s were brought to an end with small real costs because the regime put in place to eliminate the inflation was credible. This credibility was achieved by: i) a return to the gold standard; ii) the establishment of independent central banks, and iii) government commitments to balance their budgets. Baxter focuses on the anti-inflation policy reforms undertaken in Argentina and Chile in the late 1970s. To measure the credibility of these reforms, she uses a Bayesian approach to measure the public's subjective probability that the reforms would be maintained. The results suggest that the government in Argentina was not able to maintain credibility because they undertook actions that were inconsistent with the new regime. That is, unscheduled devaluations and large government deficits.
19
Figures 6 and 7 indicate that coefficients on all explanatory variables in (4) are time-varying and this finding suggests that Xt should be interacted with each of these variables. However, this approach is not practical given the limited number of available observations. 20 In contrast to Figures 1 and 2 , the series used to construct the one show in Figure 8 are estimated using the quarterly average of the money stocks rather than the money stock in the last money of each quarter. The latter approach was used earlier in the paper so that we could compare near-term and annual targets. However, since the third quarter of 1975 the Federal Reserve has specified that the annual targets apply to quarter-over-quarter growth.
